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Abstract
We built a novel scalable, low-cost, and generic platform named PhishPrint to enable the evaluation of Web Security Crawlers
(WSCs) against previously unknown cloaking weaknesses. PhishPrint completely avoids the use of any simulated phishing sites
and blocklisting measurements. We used PhishPrint to evaluate an unprecedented number of WSCs (23) including highly ubiquitous services such as Google Safe Browsing and Microsoft Outlook e-mail scanners. Our 70-day study found several unknown
cloaking weaknesses with which we constructed 5 effective cloaking attack vectors (including 4 novel ones). In particular, it
was shown that the entire WSC ecosystem is extremely vulnerable to a novel browser fingerprinting-based cloaking attack.
We confirmed the practical impact of our findings by deploying 20 evasive phishing web pages that embedded the 5 cloaking
vectors. 18 of the pages managed to survive indefinitely despite aggressive self-reporting of the pages to all WSCs. We confirmed
the specificity of these attack vectors with 1150 volunteers as well as 400K web users. We also discuss countermeasures that
all WSCs should take up in terms of both their crawler infrastructure as well as reporting infrastructure. We have relayed the
found cloaking weaknesses to the 23 WSCs through an elaborate vulnerability disclosure process that resulted in some remedial
actions as well as multiple vulnerability rewards.

Keywords. browser fingerprinting, web security crawlers, cloaking, web security and privacy
ix
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Introduction

The web has been seeing an increasing amount of social engineering attacks of late. Web-based social engineering attacks such as
phishing and malvertisements [48] have been on the rise [16, 17, 33]. URL Blocklisting services such as Google’s Safe Browsing
(GSB) and Microsoft’s SmartScreen have been working as front-line defenses in protecting the users against these kinds of attacks.
Most web browsers lookup domain names in these blocklists before proceeding to display the web pages to the users. For example,
Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and Samsung Internet web browsers which together account for about 90% of market share use the GSB
blocklist [3]. GSB is deployed in about two billion devices worldwide and shows millions of browser warnings every week protecting users from web attacks. Such blocklists are populated by bots of Web Security Crawlers (WSCs) that regularly scout web-pages
to evaluate them. In order to evade these security bots, miscreants have begun to use many cloaking techniques [25, 39, 52].
Despite such great importance, WSCs have been understudied. There are only a few recent research works focusing on
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the WSC infrastructure [37, 39, 40]. However, none of these works allow for discovery
of large-scale unknown cloaking weaknesses in the WSC infrastructure. Further, as all of these evaluation systems require the
use of simulated phishing websites, scale and cost issues can arise for researchers trying to evaluate WSCs. However, as the
web become increasingly complex, more novel cloaking attacks tend to arise. So, it is very important for the security community
to be proactive in finding cloaking weaknesses and fix them. For this reason, we built a scalable, low-cost and generic platform
named PhishPrint to enable evaluation of Web Security Crawlers (WSCs). PhishPrint can help find cloaking weaknesses and
mine novel cloaking vectors.
We will discuss this PhishPrint’s design in more detail in § 2 and describe the system in § 3. All experiments and their
results are presented in § 4 and § 5, while mitigations are covered in § 6. We discuss vulnerability disclosure, limitations, ethical
considerations and future work plans in § 7 and related work in § 8.
We make the following contributions with this paper:
1. Built a novel scalable, low-cost, and generic platform named PhishPrint to enable evaluation of Web Security Crawlers
(WSCs) that completely avoids use of blocklisting measurements and phishing sites.
2. Deployed PhishPrint in a 70-day longitudinal study to collect sensitive multi-dimensional profiling data from 23 WSCs
specifically and more than 80 WSCs cumulatively.
3. Found several cloaking weaknesses in all WSCs and used them to construct 5 effective cloaking vectors including 4 novel
vectors targeting areas such as: Browser Anomalies, Network Data and Advanced Browser Fingerprints.
4. Verified the effectiveness of the cloaking attack vectors by conducting phishing experiments involving aggressive self-reporting
to all WSCs.
5. Devised a simple and intuitive cloaking weakness evaluation metric named CV Defense Score and used it to measure and
compare the performance of all WSCs in combating 6 cloaking vectors that we devised.
6. Performed a 1150-people user study for measuring evasive attack specificity and used a large-scale fingerprint repository
1

to confirm the specificity of a particularly serious browser fingerprinting-based cloaking attack vector.
7. Suggested concrete mitigation measures in areas of crawler and reporting infrastructure to combat the cloaking vectors and
profiling attacks againsts WSCs. Performed vulnerability disclosure with all WSCs and initiated some remedial actions from
WSCS.
We also state that we are willing to share our PhishPrint codebase selectively with all security researchers and WSC
community members to enable further evaluation studies on the WSC ecosystem.
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Motivation

The main goal of our research is to be able to evaluate the performance of a large number of WSCs in terms of their ability to defend against existing as well as new cloaking attack vectors. Recently, researchers have built a framework named PhishFarm [37]
for this purpose which was also used in [39]. PhishFarm can be used by first registering thousands of new and previously-unseen
domain names. Each of these domain names will be used as a unique token for hosting a simulated phishing website that will
be geared towards a specific cloaking attack vector (called a “filter"). For example, while some token sites will serve phishing
content only to clients coming from the U.S., some others can serve phishing content to only mobile clients. All the websites
are then split into multiple disparate sets such that every set contains sites hosting all the intended cloaking attacks. These sets of
token websites are then reported to different WSCs as potential “phishing sites". Each WSC’s performance in combating specific
cloaking attack vectors can then be deduced by observing how soon the corresponding token phishing sites get blocked across
various web browsers. However, this approach has some limitations as below.
1. Anti-phishing browser blocklists and domain registrars often block sites at second-level domain (2LD / TLD+1) level [5,6,13].
Because of this, multiple 2LDs have to be registered for testing each WSC. Moreover, it is essential to submit multiple sites
containing the same attack vector to each WSC in order to perform accurate analysis. This results in a prohibitive increase
in cost as the number of WSCs increase. For example, 2,380 .com domains were registered for studying 10 WSCs in [37].
2. Moreover, once a domain becomes blocklisted by a security entity, the website tends to be unreachable in a lot of web
browsers due to browser or registrar-level blocking. Due to this, performing longitudinal studies observing the behavior of
WSCs over a cloaking attack website over extended periods of time becomes very difficult.
3. Hosting providers tend to disable access to entire hosting accounts if they discover abuse on any one of the hosted sites [8].
As a result, it becomes imperative to obtain prior immunity (as was done in [37]) from hosting providers before performing
the experiments.
4. Specific cloaking attack vectors have to be decided beforehand in PhishFarm. It will not be able to support unknown cloaking
defense weaknesses. For example, in [37] only two specific geolocation-based cloaking vectors (“U.S." and “non-U.S." filters)
were studied. However, there are a wide range of other geolocation cloaking vectors possible for different combinations of
countries. Consider a particular WSC that scans every website twice from two countries: U.S. and Italy. Thus, this WSC will
be susceptible to websites that “serve malicious content to all but Italian and U.S. IPs”. With PhishFarm’s setup in [37], the
system would have simply evaluated this WSC as being robust to both the tested geolocation cloaking vectors as it scans
and blocks websites with both filters by visiting from one U.S. and one non-U.S. IP address. Thus, the system would evaluate
this WSC as being robust to geolocation cloaking attacks although it has a glaring weakness.
Hence, we designed PhishPrint to overcome all the above limitations. Our design is based on one simple but key idea: In
order to study the resilience of WSCs against cloaking attacks at scale, it is not necessary to use multiple phishing websites; we
can simply use multiple benign websites as tokens to collect rich profiling information (such as IP addresses, HTTP headers,
3

fingerprints etc.) from each WSC over an extended period of time. By analyzing this collected profiling information, we can mine
for any cloaking attack vectors that may exist for different WSCs. Note that this approach of assessing WSCs by mining new
cloaking attack vectors is more direct than PhishFarm’s approach of assessing WSCs by observing the effects of blocklisting
on phishing websites that are pre-fitted with specific cloaking vectors.
By not requiring to pre-specify any cloaking vectors, PhishPrint’s approach allows us to be effective at evaluating WSCs
with potentially unknown cloaking defense weaknesses. For example, say that, we would like to know whether a particular WSC
has any geographical cloaking defense weaknesses. PhishPrint will report a multitude of token URLs to that WSC and collect
profiling information from that WSC over an extended period of time. This information will include all the IP addresses from
which they scan. If the only countries associated with these IP address are Italy and India, then it becomes clear that a cloaking
website setup to serve malicious content to the rest of the world but benign content only to Italy and India, will likely be able
to evade this WSC easily. Thus, PhishPrint can enable us to mine cloaking attack vectors in a generic manner. All cloaking attack
vectors that we were able to mine from PhishPrint’s data are described in 4.1
Further, the use of benign websites in PhishPrint’s design allows for several advantages. Firstly, they will not get blocked
by any of the security vendors. Thus, no special immunity needs to be obtained from the hosting providers when attempting to use
the system. Secondly, since the websites do not get blocked, it will also be possible to perform longitudinal analysis of behavior
of the WSCs by observing their visits to a specific website over an extended period of time. Thirdly, using benign websites allows
us to infer any pre-detection data sharing practices between different WSCs. Finally, because these websites will not get blocked,
we will be able to build multiple token websites by simply registering a single 2LD and creating an unlimited number of 3LDs
under it. With this approach, unlimited token sites can be built at the cost of registering just one 2LD. This will greatly help in
making PhishPrint a very low-cost, scalable system to evaluate a large number of WSCs over an extended period of time. For this
reason, we adopted the approach of using multiple 3LDs for building the profiling websites that collect information from WSCs.
One might argue that using multiple 3LDs under a single 2LD will deliver a lot less diverse profiling information from WSCs
than using multiple 2LDs. However, our experimental results hint that this is not the case. In § 4.2, we show that we were able
to collect a lot of diverse profiling information from different WSCs by using a single .com 2LD. Moreover, the results from
our Attack Module deployment show that this profiling information generalizes well enough to help cloak 20 simulated phishing
2LDs created under the .xyz TLD (§ 5.1.2). Further, we also perform a small control experiment where we also show that there
is not much variation in using 3LDs vs 2LDs for hosting the profiling websites ( § 4.2.2).
We have thus shown how PhishPrint’s design choice enables it to overcome all the four limitations that were present in a
previous WSC evaluation system. It is geared to be a highly scalable, low-cost framework that can collect profiling information
from WSCs over an extended period of time and enable mining of unknown cloaking attack weaknesses.
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Figure 1: PhishPrint: System Overview
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System Description

Our PhishPrint system is made up of two modules (see Fig. 1). The main module is the Profiling Module which uses a large
number of benign websites 4 to collect and analyze sensitive profiling information from WSCs and find any cloaking defense
weaknesses. These weaknesses can then be harnessed to mine cloaking attack vectors. The efficacy of these attack vectors can
then be verified with the Attack Module which uses an array of simulated phishing websites 8 for this.
The working of the Profiling Module begins with the Token URL Generator 1 whose job is to periodically generate unique,
never-before-seen URLs that will be given as tokens to various WSCs. The URLs are also stored in a database 5 . Although
each URL is unique, they all point to a single Profiling Website 4 server that we maintain. As discussed in § 2, we use unique
3LDs (all under a single 2LD) for generating these URLs. The mapping between the token URLs and the web server instance
was set up with the help of wildcard DNS records and .htaccess rewrite rules.
The Web Scan Requestor 2 receives URLs periodically from the Token URL Generator and reports them to different WSCs 3
as potential “phishing URLs". We went through an elaborate process to find a comprehensive list of WSCs that can be supported by
the requestor module. Firstly, we included WSCs such as Google Safe Browsing (GSB) and Microsoft SmartScreen which power
the URL blocklists of most web browsers covering millions of users. We also added support for WSCs such as PhishTank, APWG,
and ESET which along with GSB and SmartScreen have all been studied in previous WSC research [37]. Further, we went through
the list of URL scanning services hosted by VirusTotal [12] and included 17 additional WSCs that have a publicly accessible
reporting interface. To our knowledge, none of these have been studied previously. We also tested various communication

5

applications such as e-mail clients and social media apps with token URLs to see if we could find evidence of any WSCs being
employed by these vendors. In this process, we discovered that Microsoft employs a WSC to pre-scan all URLs received by its
Office 365 customers using the Outlook e-mail service [1]. Given that Office 365 is a hugely popular application with a current
subscriber base of more than 250 million people [11], we also included it as a WSC to be evaluated bringing the total list of WSCs
to 231 (listed in 1st column of Table 1). The Web Scan Requestor module is built to use different methods such as Selenium-based
browser automation code, emails as well as direct web API calls in order to send periodic phishing URL reports to the 23 WSCs.
After receiving the reports, the WSCs will visit the token URLs. As already noted, all these URLs point to a single web server
hosting a Profiling Website 4 . We designed this website to be able to extract browser fingerprints (BFPs) of any visitor without
requiring any user interaction. For this, we adapted (with permission) the browser fingerprinting code developed and used for the
AmIUnique project [2, 31]. This provided us with a couple of advantages. Firstly, AmIUnique’s website is a good example of a
cross-browser compatible website using modern HTML5 features such as Canvas, WebGL and Web Audio features to carry out its
fingerprinting activities. By having this code in our profiling site, we were able to check if the WSCs have “Real Browsers” that can
successfully run such web client code. Secondly, AmIUnique is a large-scale project that has collected BFPs from more than 2 million visitors. By using their code, we were able to directly lookup the collected BFPs of the WSCs in their database and measure the
false positives that a BFP-based cloaking attack might face. Note that the webserver will also store in the database the client’s IP address and the HTTP request headers along with all the collected BFPs to enable a comprehensive analysis of the behavior of WSCs.
After eliciting a suitable number of crawls over an extended period of time, we can ascribe the collected BFP data and HTTP
metadata to different WSCs by using the token URLs as a common factor 5 . We can then conduct a thorough analysis of
the cloaking defenses of specific WSCs 6 . This results in mining of different cloaking attack vectors 7 . The mined cloaking
vectors can then be evaluated using the Attack Module. The module contains an array of evasive simulated phishing websites
that are bootstrapped to use the mined cloaking vectors. It is important to note that some of the mined cloaking vectors rely
on blocklists that need to stay up-to-date in order remain continually effective. As a result, in order to use these kind of cloaking
vectors, the Profiling Module needs to continue to run throughout the run time of the Attack Module. More details about the
setup of the phishing websites are discussed in § 5.
We used PHP, Python and JavaScript for building all the above described modules with about 20K lines of code. In the
interest of making a real impact in improving the security architecture of WSCs, we plan to release our code to vetted academic
researchers as well as members of the WSC community upon request. However, we are abstaining from making a public release
of our code in order to deter risks of possible abuse of the system by malicious actors.

1 We also discovered that some media applications such as Slack and Facebook Messenger scan our token URLs. However, we do not consider them as WSCs
as they were clearly identifying themselves with the User-Agent headers akin to search engine bots.
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Profiling WSCs

We setup PhishPrint to run on our University network. We chose a .com 2LD for the domain name of the Profiling Websites. As
described in § 3, our system was setup to collect and analyze profiling data from 23 different WSCs (Table 1). We ran the system
for a period of 10 weeks beginning in the 2nd week of January 2020. We collected the data for a total period of 77 days (until
last week of March) in order to allow sufficient time for any delayed crawls that might be initiated from some WSCs. During
this period, PhishPrint reported 12 token URLs as fake “phishing reports" daily to each of the 23 WSCs (Ethical considerations
are discussed in § 7). These reports were sent in two hour intervals of time throughout to all the WSCs. As a result, we reported
a total of 840 token URLs to most WSCs2 over the deployment period.

4.1

Analysis and Cloaking Vectors

The above mentioned setup allowed us to collect sensitive profiling data from multiple WSCs over the 10-week period. We
analyzed the data to find WSC weaknesses and mine relevant cloaking vectors. The profiling data we considered for this can
be divided into these 3 categories: browser anomalies, network data and advanced browser fingerprints. It is to be noted that
although PhishPrint’s design allows us to study evasion weaknesses in a generic manner (§ 2), in this research, we focused only
on a few cloaking vectors from these 3 areas. In § 7, we will touch upon how PhishPrint can be used in the future to study more
vectors in these and other areas.
In this section, we will describe how the profiling data from the 3 areas was analyzed and what cloaking vectors were mined
as a result. Before this, it is helpful to first establish some terminology relating to cloaking attack vectors. Regardless of the
nature of the data being used, all cloaking vectors used by attackers trying to evade WSCs can fall into one of two classes:
Anomalies and Blocklists. We will describe these two classes below:
Anomaly cloaking vectors capitalize on characteristic anomalous behaviors exhibited by WSCs when visiting candidate
websites. These vectors can be created after finding any anomalies in the requests being made by WSCs that strongly indicate
the fact that they are not from a potential human victim. For example, consider a HTTP request made by a WSC with a headless
browser’s User-Agent. Attackers can block all such requests to avoid detection without blocking any potential victims as no
victim will use a headless browser. Thus, by definition, all these vectors work with high specificity.
Blocklist cloaking vectors rely on some specific fingerprints known to be associated with WSCs (such as from PhishPrint’s
profiling data) in order to create a blocklist for the operation of cloaking websites. For example, if there are a set of specific
IP addresses that Google uses for its GSB WSCs, they can be made part of a blocklist to evade GSB.
Blocklist vectors differ from anomaly vectors in two key aspects. Firstly, many blocklists need continuous updating in order
to be effective. For example, if a WSC keeps changing its IP addresses, then the corresponding blocklists need to be updated by
2 Forcepoint, FortiGuard and GSB are the only exceptions. Forcepoint has a reporting limit of 5 URLs per day restricting us to 350 submitted URLs. Due
to intermittent technical issues on both server and client sides, we could only report 777 and 612 URLs to FortiGuard and GSB respectively.
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the attackers. This is not the case with anomaly vectors which rely on some specific crawler idiosyncracies that are overlooked
by the WSCs and hence remain fixed. Secondly, blocklists might block some potential victims. So, their specificity needs to
be taken into account by attackers before using them. For example, if an attacker simply blocks all /24 subnets of IP addresses
seen from a WSC and if that WSC was using a residential proxy to route its requests, then such a blocklist could potentially
cause a lot of false positives for the attacker. On the other hand, anomaly vectors are all very specific as already discussed.
We will now discuss the three areas of profiling data we analyzed in our study along with the associated cloaking vectors
that we mined and their novelty aspects.

4.1.1

Browser Anomalies

The first area of profiling data we analyzed is the data from the web browsers being used by the visiting WSCs. We observed
several anomalies in the web browsers used (or pretending to be used) by the WSCs. We categorize these into 3 different anomaly
vectors and discuss them here.
JS Execution Anomaly (JSE-A). The first anomaly we discovered was the inability of some WSCs’ clients to execute some
simple JavaScript code. For this, we checked whether or not a visiting crawler is capable of executing a test function that is
passed to Window.setInterval() method. This is very similar to the onload event-based cloaking vector used in [37] (see
Appendix A.2).
Real Browser Anomaly (RB-A). As mentioned in § 3, we adapted code from a real-world modern HTML5 website to build
our profiling website. The website is designed to ship out BFPs to the database without requiring any user interaction. We verified
that this website is cross-platform compatible by manually testing with most used web browsers such as Chrome 79, Firefox
71, Safari 11, Edge 44 and IE 11 on popular OS platforms such as Windows (Vista, 7 and 10), macOS, Linux (Ubuntu), iOS
and Android. During this process, as and when required, polyfill Javascript libraries were to maintain compatibility with older
web browsers that do not fully support some APIs such as Canvas. Further, we also performed a user study in which we verified
that more than 99% of the visiting users showed no Real Browser anomaly.
Thus, we ensured that most users’ web browsers will ship us fingerprints when they visit our website. However, we observed
that many WSCs’ are unable to ship out the fingerprints to us due to a failure on the client side. We refer to this as a Real Browser
anomaly. To our knowledge, no other previous research has attempted to do such analysis against WSCs (the “Real Browser"
vector described in [37] is synonymous with JSE-A above).
Crawler Artifacts Anomaly (CA-A). The data we collected from the profiling websites included some basic BFPs such
as properties of the navigator DOM object and all the HTTP request headers as described previously. We discovered a few
anomalies when analyzing this data from WSCs. For some WSCs, we saw that the navigator.useragent value does not match
the User-Agent header. Similarly, navigator.platform does not always match the platform indicated in the User-Agent
header. For example, it was common to see cases where the User-Agent header indicates a Windows platform, but the
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navigator.platform indicates a Linux platform. Similarly, we saw a number of cases where the User-Agent bears indicators
of automation such as curl, phantomjs, headless etc.
Further, we also found discrepancies in the values of navigator.webdriver. This is a Boolean field that indicates whether
a web browser is being driven by browser automation software such as Selenium. While for most web browsers the default
value of this field in a non-automated browser is set to false, in Chrome it is set to undefined. In this regard, we noticed that
in some WSCs, navigator.webdriver was being set to false even though the User-Agent indicated a Chrome browser. This
is a clear anomaly and shows that the property had been tampering with. It is to be also noted that [49] has used similar but more
elaborate methods to find inconsistencies introduced by privacy-protecting browsers and extensions. However, to our knowledge,
ours is the first work that focuses on trying to find such inconsistencies in the browsers used by WSCs. We use the term Crawler
Artifacts to refer to a cloaking vector that relies on all these anomalies.

4.1.2

Network Data

For this part of the analysis, we focused on the IP addresses used by WSCs for initiating web requests to PhishPrint. We collected
these addresses during our deployment period and crafted IP Address Blocklists (IP-B). Thus, we were able to mine a blocklist
cloaking vector from PhishPrint’s data. Note that real-world attackers tend to use massive blocklists made of IP addresses for
building phishing sites [38]. Hence, it is very important to measure how well WSCs are doing (both specifically as well as
cumulatively) in defending against this vector. The performance of WSCs against in-the-wild IP blocklists has been studied
before [37]. However, the novel scalable nature of PhishPrint now allows us to directly collect a large amount of network
infrastructure data and then analyze and compare this across an extensive set of WSCs. In addition, we also mapped the collected IP
addresses to their associated countries in order to measure the geolocation variety of the network infrastructure setup by the WSCs.
AS Blocklist (AS-B). Upon analyzing the Autonomous System (AS) names of the collected IP addresses, we also discovered
that many WSCs are housing their crawlers in IP address spaces that can be mapped to web or cloud hosting companies (such
as Amazon, DigitalOcean) or the organizations related to the WSCs themselves (such as Google, Microsoft, BitDefender, Cisco).
We were able to make a list of 66 such AS names. We refer to this as an AS Blocklist. As it is unlikely for a potential victim
to be visiting an attacker’s website from such IP addresses, an attacker can easily use as AS Blocklist to evade WSCs.
AS Blocklist is a hybrid between anomaly and blocklist cloaking vectors. Similar to anomaly vectors, it is based on an anomaly
and is relatively static as it is unlikely for offending WSCs to frequently change their network infrastructure between different
cloud networks. On the other hand, similar to other blocklist vectors, it takes extensive data collection efforts to construct lists
like this as there a myriad number of web hosting entities. Further, if the blocklist is poorly constructed and includes AS names
of victim IP spaces, then there could be specificity issues as with other blocklist vectors. We empirically demonstrate that this
is not the case with AS Blocklist with a large-scale user study (5.2). To our knowledge, ours is the first work to study such AS
level aspects of the network infrastructure of WSCs.
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4.1.3

Advanced Browser Fingerprints

Recent privacy-oriented studies such as [19, 24] have shown Canvas, WebGL and Font list (obtained via JS) fingerprinting to
be among the most discriminatory identifiers. As a further testament to this, these browser fingerprints (BFPs) have also been
used to develop authentication schemes [15, 28]. At the same time, privacy researchers have also shown that such fingerprints
are not easy to defend against and require elaborate measures [26, 32, 42, 53]. Given this, there is a high potential for developing
an effective cloaking vector if WSCs do not take adequate measures to defend against these fingerprinting techniques. Hence,
we wanted to analyze these BFPs after we collect them from WSCs. In order to collect these BFPs we relied on AmIUnique’s
implementation as described in § 3. For both Canvas and WebGL BFPs (both first introduced in [34] and later used in [24]),
their implementation draws a hidden image on the webpage and a cryptographic hash of that image is produced to be used as
a fingerprint. For font BFPs, a simple trick first proposed in [36] and later used in [24] is used to detect the list of fonts that are
installed in the client using JavaScript. A cryptographic hash of the font list serves as the font fingerprint for the client.
Our analysis showed that the entire WSC ecosystem exhibits very little dynamism across these three BFPs. To capitalize
on this, we propose a novel blocklist cloaking vector. For this, we follow the approaches of prior BFP studies [24, 31], by using
a tuple of the three BFPs: <Font, Canvas, WebGL> (or <F,C,W>) in order to effectively combine their individual fingerprinting
capabilities. Our proposed <F,C,W> Blocklist (FCW-B) for this simply stores all <F,C,W>s seen from WSCs in the past to
aid future evasion.

4.2

Profiling Analysis Results

In this section, along with an overview of the profiling data we collected during the 10-week study, we will present measurements
indicating performance of the WSCs against the six cloaking vectors we introduced previously. All these results are presented
in Table 1. For brevity, we refer to “Column X in Table 1" as X . 1 lists all the WSCs we studied.
VT Sharing. During analysis and investigation, we found that 8 WSCs have shared their token URLs with VirusTotal [12]
(VT). This sharing has taken place at varying degrees. Malwares and Quttera have shared more than 99.5% of their URLs with
VT, while Bitdefender and PhishTank have shared about 10 and 30% of their URLs with VT. VT hosts more than 80 WSCs that
begin scanning the uploaded URLs almost immediately. As a result, all such VT-shared URLs need to be considered separately.
For this, we created a “virtual WSC" named “VT Ecosystem" and consider all VT-shared URLs exclusively here. We treat this
virtual WSC equivalent to other WSCs in the rest of this paper. Since Malwares and Quttera shared most of their URLs with
VT, no meaningful specific analysis can be made for these WSCs. Hence, we avoid their individual rows in the table and just
show them as part of the VT ecosystem. It is to be noted that due to the large number (80) of WSCs hosted on VT (including
18 of our 23 WSCs), the VT ecosystem be considered as a cumulative representative of the entire WSC ecosystem.
2 shows the number of URLs submitted, the number of URLs scanned by the WSCs and the number of URLs contributed

share with VT by each WSC. Overall, in the 10 week period, we submitted about 18,532 token URLs with distinct 3LDs to all
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the 23 WSCs. In terms of crawl back rates, most of the WSCs were pretty good with many of them visiting more than 90% of
the submitted URLs. A notable exception is Norton which visited only 53 of the submitted URLs. The total number of URLs
submitted to VT by other WSCs was 803. 3 describes the number of URLs remaining to be analyzed after we excluded the
VT URLs. These are the URLs we consider for computing the CVD scores as already mentioned. 3 also lists the number of
sessions established for the analyzed URLs indicating the total number of visits made. While WSCs such as PhishTank, and
Scumware establish 50 to 100 sessions for each analyzed URL, some others such as GSB, SmartScreen and Forcepoint visit each
URL only once or twice. Overall, as many as 348,516 sessions were established for scanning 18,532 distinct URLs we submitted.
4 shows the median of time deltas between the first crawl time and the URL submission time for URLs submitted to each WSC.

Some WSCs such as Fortinet and SmartScreen have a slow average response time whereas many other WSCs including GSB,
Outlook take only a few seconds.
CVD Scores. In order to compare the performance of all the WSCs across the six cloaking vectors, we need an intuitive
performance metric. For this, we devised a simple metric called Cloaking Vector Defense Score (CVD score). The CVD score
can be computed for any given WSC (say, W ) and a cloaking vector (say, V ). Assume that we reported x URLs to W and it
scanned y of them (ignoring the VT-shared URLs) during our entire study. We conduct an a posterori analysis of all the y URLs
to determine how many of them were visited at least once by a crawler that does not exhibit the weakness associated with V .
If such a number is z, we report the CVD score of the pair (W,V ) as yz ×100.
Doing this a posterori analysis for an anomaly vector is straightforward as we simply need to determine if at least one of
the many requests a URL might receive exhibits the anomaly being considered. However, in the case of blocklist vectors, we
will need the respective blocklists in order to make this determination for a given request. We build this blocklist dynamically
using all the historic data collected from the WSC prior to the current request. For example, in order to determine if a request
r at time t can be blocked by a blocklist vector V , we use all prior requests to the WSC before t to build a blocklist and see if
the current request can be blocked by such as blocklist. If it does, we determine this to be a weak request and do not consider it.
From the above, we can see that the CVD score, by definition, reflects the chance (as a %) of a given cloaking vector to launch
a cloaking attack against a given WSC. 5 to 10 show the CVD scores of the WSCs over the six vectors we described previously.
We use red, yellow and green colors in the table to show the bad (< 33.3), moderate(33−66) and good (> 66) scores respectively.
JSE-A, RB-A. 5 shows that the JSE-A CVD scores are good all across the spectrum of WSCs. This demonstrates a positive
evolution from the situation in [37] which showed that only 1 of the 5 studied WSCs had good score. More such evolutionary
changes in WSCs have been described in A.2. On the other hand, many WSCs seem to be failing in handling the Real Browser
Anomaly vector 6 that we developed. The only notable exceptions are APWG and the VT ecosystem. We noticed that GSB,
for example, completely fails to support the WebGL API in many of its crawlers. Some other notable failures are Outlook, Avira
and Forcepoint that did not visit even a single submitted URL with a Real Browser. The overall combined CVD score of all
WSCs in this respect is thus only 35.2 which shows a lot of scope for improvement.
CA-A. Another positive results is that most WSCs seem to to have some crawlers that do not carry crawler artifacts 7 .
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1

WSCs

AlienVault
APWG
Avira
Badware
Bitdefender
Dr.Web
ESET
Forcepoint
FortiGuard
Fortinet
GSB
SmartScreen
Norton
Notmining
OpenPhish
Outlook
PhishTank
Scumware
Sophos
Sucuri
ZeroCERT
VT Ecosystem
All
Best Score

Browser Anomalies

2

3

4

# URLs
Submitted
/ Scanned
/ VT Shared

# URLs
Analyzed
/ # Sessions

Reply
Time

840 / 837 / 0
840 / 839 / 0
840 / 837 / 0
840 / 837 / 0
840 / 542 / 67
840 / 836 / 0
840 / 764 / 0
350 / 295 / 0
777 / 764 / 8
840 / 772 / 5
612 / 591 / 0
840 / 822 / 0
840 / 53 / 0
840 / 838 / 0
840 / 835 / 0
840 / 672 / 0
840 / 838 / 259
840 / 633 / 2
840 / 793 / 0
840 / 830 / 0
840 / 840 / 462
2483 / 2465 / 18532 / 16730 / 803
-

837 / 2354
839 / 4658
837 / 2082
837 / 837
475 / 3918
836 / 846
764 / 987
295 / 295
756 / 4590
767 / 4495
591 / 775
822 / 1133
53 / 69
838 / 1675
835 / 4928
672 / 676
579 / 45976
631 / 29537
793 / 2170
830 / 2488
378 / 1152
2465 / 232875
16730 / 348516
-

0:00:16
0:00:10
0:50:27
0:00:08
4:16:10
0:00:22
3:35:02
0:00:24
0:00:46
11:45:36
0:00:04
2:58:11
0:31:42
0:00:10
1:00:02
0:00:18
0:00:10
0:25:47
0:01:47
0:00:09
0:05:11
0:04:18
0:01:15
-

Network Data

5

6

7

JSE-A

RB-A

CA-A

# IPs
/ # CCs

99.5
100
92.1
99.8
97.9
79.8
99.7
85.1
97.1
98.8
99.2
99.8
86.8
84.3
99.8
98.7
100
100
97.6
87.2
100
99.9
96.3
100

18.9
99.5
0
0
40.2
0
17.9
0
9.4
5.9
23.9
44.0
13.2
0
59.6
0
82.2
80.0
3.5
0
0.5
98.8
35.2
99.5

0
99.8
0
100
97.3
0
100
45.8
100
100
100
77.6
88.7
0
100
100
100
100
91.2
100
100
100
77.4
100

1/1
2726 / 8
70 / 3
1/1
62 / 10
15 / 3
12 / 2
1/1
19 / 3
2/2
619 / 83
50 / 2
19 / 3
1/1
2/2
535 / 1
4096 / 50
1643 / 59
26 / 3
837 / 70
3/1
7795 /76
15394 /113
-
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Advanced BFPs
9

10

IP-B

AS-B

# <F,C,W>s
/ #F - #C - #W
(FCW-B)

0.1
99.1
8.4
0.1
9.1
1.8
1.4
0.3
2.0
0.3
94.4
2.6
34.0
0.1
0.1
79.5
93.4
82.9
2.0
100
0.8
82.1
33.4
99.1

0
62.9
43.0
100
79.6
71.8
99.9
100
12.7
7.4
90.9
100
98.1
0
0
0
100
100
100
96.6
100
99.8
65.6
100

2 / 1-2-2 (0.2)
6 / 7-7-3 (0.6)
0 / 0-0-0 (0)
0 / 0-0-0 (0)
46 / 46-38-12 (9.3)
0 / 0-0-0 (0)
6 / 3-6-3 (0.8)
0 / 0-0-0 (0)
27 / 25-25-8 (3.4)
12 / 12-11-6 (1.6)
2 / 2-2-2 (0.3)
17 / 13-8-5 (1.7)
1 / 1-1-1 (1.9)
0 / 0-0-0 (0)
1 / 1-1-1 (0.1)
0 / 1-1-0 (0)
51 / 55-69-19 (7.4)
27 / 37-32-5 (3.0)
3 / 2-3-1 (0.4)
0 / 0-0-0 (0)
1 / 2-2-1 (0.3)
101 / 111-97-21 (3.1)
204 / 182-162-36 (1.1)
9.3

Table 1: An overview of all the profiling information collected and cloaking vectors mined by PhishPrint from 23 WSCs
However, some WSCs such as AlienVault and Avira have an anomalous navigator.webdriver which was causing all their
crawler visits to be easily evadable. On a related note, PhishTank was exposing another artifact from its web portal.
IP-B. The IP-B CVD scores along with the number of distinct IP addresses of source requests and the countries they are associated (# CCs) with is in 8 . We note that as many as 11 WSCs make their visits from less than 20 distinct IP addresses even though
they visit hundreds of domains forming thousands of sessions across time. WSCs such as AlienVault and OpenPhish visit only from
1 or 2 IP addresses. A control experiment reports later that this situation persists even when doing repeated reports from diverse
sources (§ 4.2.2). On the other hand URLs submitted to some WSCs including GSB, Outlook, PhishTank and APWG are scanned
by a large number of distinct IP addresses. For PhishTank, this number is as high as 4096 IP addresses (spread over 51 countries) for
the 579 URLs we analyzed. Figure 2 charts the growth of the distinct number of IP addresses we have seen across the days of our
experiment. The graphs shows a near-linear growth for APWG and GSB indicating greatest diversity in IP addresses. SmartScreen
shows an interesting IP infrastructure growth. The number of IP addresses was 1 for the first 50 days of the experiment but has
risen to 50 in the last 20 days. This indicates an infrastructure change during the last 20 days which was referred to during our vulnerability disclosure process as well. One more interesting point to note is the number of countries associated with the IP addresses.
APWG is interesting example, in that even though they employ 2726 IP addresses, they are all associated with only 8 countries
which makes a country-based cloaking vector feasible for targeting victims outside those 8 countries. The CVD scores demonstrate
a very polarized situation with roughly half the WSCs having very good scores >80 and half having very bad scores <10.
AS-B. Many WSCs including Outlook and AlienVault showed bad AS-B CVD scores 9 . Outlook, in particular was using
crawlers that were all housed in a Microsoft IP space and is hence evadable despite using a large number of IPs for visiting the
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Figure 2: Growth of distinct IP addresses and fingerprints in PhishPrint database for different WSCs
URLs. The same is the case with FortiGuard, Avira and OpenPhish who were using common cloud and web hosting companies for
housing their crawler bots. On the other hand, there were several WSCs such as PhishTank and GSB performed well in this respect.
FCW-B. 10 shows the the number of distinct <F,C,W> BFPs and the individual Font, Canvas and WebGL BFPs collected
from the WSCs. It also shows the FCW-B CVD scores. Despite scanning 16,730 distinct domains and initiating 348,516 HTTP
sessions that shipped BFPs over 70 days,we see that WSCs collectively only had 204 distinct <F,C,W> BFPs including 162
Canvas and 182 Font fingerprints. These numbers can be put into perspective by seeing that a prior BFP study [24] using the
same implementation as ours has collected as many as 78K distinct Canvas FPs and 17K distinct Font FPs over a 6-month period
with the help of a few regional websites 3 . Further, we can also notice that overall, these WSCs used as many as 15,394 distinct
IP addresses. This shows that while many WSCs are actively trying to change their network infrastructure fingerprints, little
is being done to vary the advanced browser fingerprints such as <F,C,W> BFPs.
Inspecting the individual rows, we can see that even WSCs that invested a lot into their network infrastructure such as GSB
and APWG only have a handful of distinct <F,C,W> BFPs (2 and 6). Note that 7 WSCs have a 0 score in combating the RB-A
cloaking vector. This means their browsers are not even capable of running the fingerprinting code and hence we did not collect
any <F,C,W> BFPs from them. Some WSCs such as PhishTank, Bitdefender and the VT ecosystem fare slightly better with 51,
46 and 101 distinct values of <F,C,W> BFPs. However, these still not seem be to sufficient as demonstrated by the FCW-B CVD
scores. Bitdefender’s score although the highest among all WSCs is still only 9.3. This means that more than 90% of the token
URLs would have evaded detection from Bitdefender using the <F,C,W>s as a simple blocklist. It is also interesting to see the
growth rate graphs of distinct font, canvas and BFPs collected by PhishPrint. While the IP addresses had an almost linear growth
for many WSCs (such as GSB and APWG), the Font and Canvas FP growth rates present a completely opposite picture. As GSB
has only 2 such BFPs that were used from day 1, it’s just a flat line. For APWG, PhishTank and Bitdefender, the growth rate is very
low in the last 30 days showing 0, X and X new Canvas FPs during that period. This indicates the high likelihood of a successful
blocklist cloaking vector which we will demonstrate later § 5. SmartScreen has only 17 <F,C,W> BFPs for its 822 URLs. The
growth rate for these is in a step-wise fashion with long flat lines indicating again the utility of a blocklist cloaking vector.
Further, this best score of 9.3 remains in very stark contrast with best scores for the other five cloaking vectors as shown in the
3 This study did not include AmIUnique’s current WebGL FP implementation. Further, our experiments showed they are the least specific of the 3 BFPs § 4.2.1.

Hence, we avoid discussing WebGL FPs here. However, we do use these as part of the <F,C,W> tuple as already described.
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BFP

#

Unique

Median

75%

95%

Max

Sum

Font
Canvas
WebGL

53
46
16

20
11
1

0.0009%
0.0034%
0.081%

0.042%
0.07%
2.09%

2.16%
1.57%
5.53%

12.46%
2.17%
11.47%

25.46%
10.47%
25.63%

Table 2: Comparison of WSC BFPs with AmIUnique dataset
final row of the table. This shows that while the other cloaking vectors are being well handled by atleast some WSCs, advanced
BFPs such as <F,C,W> BFPs present a grave cloaking weakness that seems to be affecting all the entities in the WSC ecosystem.

4.2.1

Specificity of Advanced BFPs

As FCW-B is a blocklist vector, its specificity needs to be taken into account as already discussed. This is even more important
given that our longitudinal study showed this vector is the only one which cannot be defended by any entity in the WSCs
ecosystem. Hence, we attempted to measure FCW-B specificity by collecting a set of <F,C,W> BFPs from WSCs and measuring
how common they are among regular internet users. For this, we re-deployed PhishPrint on 3 days spread evenly over September
2020. We collected all BFPs from 5 major WSCs (listed in Fig 3) by sending 12 token URLs each day to each of the 5 WSCs.
It is to be noted that 35 of these 180 URLs (including 34 PhishTank URLs) were shared with VirusTotal immediately, thereby
soliciting crawls from many of the 80 VT WSCs similar to the longitudinal study. At the end of each day, we waited for a 24 hour
period and then sent the collected BFPs to AmIUnique project’s API [2]4 . This allowed us to directly measure the percentage of
AmIUnique visitors who have the same Font, Canvas or WebGL FPs. Each time we made a query, the API would look up the data
of visitors in the past 90 days5 . As our 3 querying days are spread across a one month period, the datasets of visitors against which
our BFPs were compared on each day is different. Among the 3 datasets, the smallest dataset is made up of 467,696 visitors.
Table 2 summarizes the results of all our queries. In total, we collected and queried 53 Font, 46 Canvas and 16 WebGL FPs.
Interestingly, we noticed that many WSCs continued to carry the same BFPs as the ones we saw in our longitudinal study despite
the 6 month difference in time. For example, all FPs collected from APWG and SmartScreen were already seen in the previous
study. In total, 71.3% of BFPs were already collected previously. The table shows the distribution of prevalence (in %) of the 3
BFPs and the graphs in Fig 3 break this data down by each WSC. Similar to results from prior privacy-oriented BFP studies [31],
this data shows that most of the BFPs are very rare with only a handful of BFPs being prevalent in more than 1% of the visitors.
For example, as many as 20 Font FPs were unique and not seen among any of the visitors. The table also shows the sum of all these
BFP prevalence percentages which could be used as a direct measure of specificity if these BFPs were individually used as cloaking
vectors. For example, the lowest of these is 10.47% for Canvas FP thus indicating that attackers will only lose about 10.47% of
potential victims if they were to use a blocklist made solely of Canvas-based WSC FPs as their cloaking vector. However, if they
used a more specific cloaking vector such as the triplet <F,C,W>, we can expect this lost victim percentage to be even lesser. Fig
4 We thank AmIUnique project developers for permitting us to submit up to 100 queries to their internal web API for this experiment.
5 Canvas and Font BFPs are relatively stable for a user with a median lifetime of more than 9 months [50].
6 Note that for some WSCs such as PhishTank and Bitdefender the markers on the y-axis refer to multiple BFPs. In these cases, if atleast one of those BFPs
was found in the longitudinal study, we marked that point in solid.
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Figure 3: CDF plots showing the prevalence of different WSCs’ BFPs among AmIUnique Visitors in %. Solid markers indicate
BFPs that were also found in the 10-week study6
2 shows that this situation is even more bleak for individual WSCs with both APWG and GSB’s Canvas FPs accounting for only
0.02% and 0.07% of all visitors. Thus, despite their massive network infrastructure (as seen in the longitudinal study, Table 1), due
to this extreme lack in diversity of BFPs, attackers can specifically evade these WSCs without fear of losing any potential victims.

4.2.2

Diverse Repeated Reporting Experiment

In August 2020, we performed another control experiment. The goal of this was to study any potential effects that repeated
reporting of token URLs from diverse sources could have on the profiling information that is collected from the WSCs. We note
that during our 10-week longitudinal study, we only registered a single 2LD and reported each token URL created under it only
a single time to each WSC. To replicate this setup, we created a similar configuration in this study by creating 50 different 3LDs
under a single .xyz 2LD (called SR). We then set up an alternate configuration for diverse and repeated reporting (called DRR) by
using 5 different .xyz TLDs. On a single day, we used PhishPrint to report each of the 50 SR 3LDs to 10 different WSCs from a
U.S. IP address (namely: AlienVault, APWG, Fortinet, GSB, SmartScreen, Norton, OpenPhish, Outlook, Sophos and ZeroCert).
On the same day, we used a private VPN provider to connect to 10 IP addresses located in 7 different countries around the world
(3 IPs in various regions of the U.S.) and submitted 10 reports on each domain in DRR set to all the WSCs. For some WSCs, such
as Outlook and APWG, where the reporting is via e-mail, we created and used 10 different e-mail addresses for each domain
in the DRR set. This setup ensured that an equal number of URL reports get sent from each configuration (50 to each WSC) in
order to keep the comparison balanced.
Table 3 shows an overview of the comparison between the profiling results obtained from the two configurations. We can
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Config
SR
DRR
Similarity

# Sessions

#IPs

# <F,C,W>

954
799

291
188

10
10

-

0.046

0.54

Table 3: Results of Diverse Repeated Reporting Experiment
see that despite repeated diverse reporting, the URLs reported via the SR configuration involved more sessions and more WSC
IP addresses. We surmise that this could be a result of some WSCs deliberately ignoring repeated reports even if coming from
diverse sources. For example, we noticed that PhishTank’s website shows an error message saying the URL is already submitted
even if we try to do a repeat submission from a different account. The final rows show the Jaccard Similarity between the IP
addresses and the <F,C,W> sets from the two configurations. The high variability in the IP addresses used by WSCs could have
caused the low similarity between the two sets. It is to be noted that if we consider the associated Autonomous Systems of the
IPs instead the similarity rises to about 0.57. Furthermore, breaking these results down by WSCs shows that all the ASs used by
8 of the 10 WSCs in the DRR set are also present in the SR set. The same is the case with <F,C,W>s where 4 of the 6 WSCs from
which we collected <F,C,W>s have a complete match. Further, the WSCs such as OpenPhish and AlienVault which showed very
less diversity in their IP space previously, have displayed exactly same behavior in the DRR set. Overall, this experiment shows
that using a non-diverse URL reporting setup as we did in our study can still enable mining of valuable profiling information.
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5

Cloaking Vectors in Action

Our large-scale WSC profiling data analysis showed that five of the six cloaking vectors we devised can exploit existing weaknesses in WSCs without specificity concerns (for FCW-B). In this section, we present supplementary experiments that directly
put these five vectors in action against WSCs as well as real users with goals to directly assess and confirm their evadability
benefits as well as false positive consequences for the attackers.

5.1

Phishing Experiments

As described in § 2, PhishPrint does not need to use simulated phishing websites for evaluating WSCs or mining new cloaking
vectors. However, in order to confirm the real-world utility of these vectors, we do need to build phishing websites powered
with the five candidate vectors, self-report them to WSCs and measure how long they will survive without getting blocked in
any of the browsers (via a Monitoring Module). Here, our approach will be similar to prior works [37, 39]. These experiments
constitute the Attack Module 8 depicted in Fig. 1.

5.1.1

Setup

For these experiments, we built two kinds of phishing websites: Baseline sites which do not employ any cloaking and PhishPrintcloaked sites which use all the five effective cloaking vectors from § 4.2: RB-A, CA-A, IP-B, AS-B and FCW-B. The cloaked
sites show benign content if any of the 5 vectors decide that the visitor should be given a cloaked page. All the cloaking logic is
implemented in server-side using a simple PHP script. The phishing payload stays encrypted (using AES-256) until the cloaking
logic returns a key to the client. If any of the five vectors decide not to show the phishing content, then some benign content gets
loaded into the pages instead of the phishing payload. We have used two kinds of simulated phishing payloads: “PayPal" and “Bank
of America". For benign payloads, we built multiple simple web pages discussing topics such as food and famous personalities.
As mentioned before in § 3, the Profiling Module needs to be running in parallel during these experiments in order to keep
the blocklists associated with IP-B and FCW-B updated with the latest profiling data. Hence, we have started performing this
experiment 25 days after Profiling Module’s deployment (first week of February 2020) to give some time for the two blocklists
to be populated while still allowing both modules to run in parallel. In the rest of this section, we will discuss the site monitoring,
reporting and web site configuration aspects of these experiments.
Monitoring Module. As the ultimate goal of the attacker is to be able continue to deliver phishing content to the victims, we
built a fully automated Monitoring Module to periodically check if phishing sites are still functional or blocked in web browsers.
We have chosen Chrome, IE and Opera desktop browsers for this as they employ different blocklists (GSB, SmartScreen and
Opera) that cover most of the web users [37, 39]. The module loads phishing sites inside the browsers and checks if the sites
are blocked or not. As browser automation libraries tend to disable browser blacklists [37], we used a web based cross-browser
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testing platform [4] for this purpose. The monitoring module runs a headless Chrome browser to open the target site in the testing
platform and uses an OCR library to do the liveness check. We found this to be a more light-weight approach than using VMs
as suggested in [37]. We did this check every 2 hours for each site. Note that while previous studies have done this monitoring
for 3 [37] or 7 [39] days, we kept monitoring our sites for a period of 1 month in order to capture any late blocking that might
happen due to our aggressive reporting strategy.
Aggressive Reporting. We used our Profiling Module’s Web Scan Requestor ( 2 in Fig. 1), to self-report all our website
to WSCs. In contrast to prior works that reported each phishing site only one time [37, 39] to a few WSCs, we opted for a much
more aggressive approach where we repeatedly report each site (once daily) over a period of two weeks to all the 23 WSCs.
It is to be noted that during the longitudinal study, we noticed that a couple of WSCs share most of their URLs to VirusTotal.
Confirming similar behavior, we found that all our phishing sites have been shared with VirusTotal too. As a result, our phishing
sites were shared and scanned by more than 80 WSCs that are hosted on VirusTotal as well.
Site configuration. For our experiments, we set up a total of 26 phishing websites. All 26 websites were hosted with accounts
by the same hosting provider (Hostinger) and had different domain names. We used 6 of these as baseline sites (with 3 free
accounts) and 20 of these as the cloaked sites powered by the 5 cloaking vectors (with 1 paid account). It is to be noted here
that despite multiple requests and conversations about the nature of our research, we were unsuccessful in getting immunity
for any of our accounts from the hosting provider. We chose only 6 sites for our baseline as there are already prior large-scale
studies establishing clearly the baseline blocklisting speed (for e.g., [39] whose results will be discussed later). For the same
reason, we did not choose to register a separate 2LD for these 6 baseline sites but used the free 3LDs provided by the hosting
provider to conserve financial resources. For the cloaked sites, we registered 20 different .xyz domain names as we were unable
to obtain that many free 3LDs. Other than this minor difference, the setup for the experiments for both sets of sites is exactly the
same. In order to prevent pre-emptive blacklisting of our websites without scanning [37], we avoided deceptive keywords such
as ‘paypal’ or ‘bank’ in the URLs for the phishing pages. We instead used words related to the benign payloads for all the URLs.

5.1.2

Results

The results show that our 6 baselines sites were quickly blocked on all the browsers. Chrome (GSB) was the quickest to do this
in 3 hours and 10 minutes. In fact, all the browsers blocked the 6 sites in about 10.5 hours. This agrees with a recent large-scale
study done on browser blocklists [39] which showed that the fastest blocklist (GSB) would block most of its 324 baseline sites
in about 3 hours time. On the other hand, none of the 20 PhishPrint-cloaked sites were blocked in the first four days despite
repeated reporting to all the WSCs. In the one month period in which we did the monitoring, only 2 sites (say, ‘A’ and ‘B’) got
blocked as shown in Table 4. A was blocked on day 57 while B got blocked on day 16. It is to be noted that even for cloaked sites
such lengthy blocking time is highly unusual. For reference, [39] study showed that most cloaked sites get either get blocked in a
7 Our cloaked sites experienced a 10 hour down time after A got blocked as our hosting provider disabled our account. We then moved all our sites to another
provider (Namecheap).
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few hours or remain unblocked. Given this, we surmised that both the blocked sites were likely due to manual vetting. To confirm
this, we investigated this by reloading the page in the browser that first blocked it (Opera). We noted that the browser message
specified the source for the blockage as a third-party report from PhishTank. When we looked up the URL on PhishTank, we
saw that our site was manually verified as a phishing URL by 3 users thus confirming our suspicions. Interestingly, we note
that 1 user has also marked our site as a benign site.
Type
Baseline
Cloaked site A
Cloaked site B

# Sites

Alive Time

6
1
1

3h, 10min
4 days, 11h
15 days, 14h

Table 4: Lifetimes of the blocked phishing sites
As for site B, we found that it was not blocklisted by any browser, but was taken down by xyz registrar on day 16 due to
an abuse report. We were unable to get further details on what the source for this report could be. The remaining 18 cloaked
sites continued to be functional through out the monitoring period of 1 month. We verified manually that even at the time of
writing this manuscript in September, the 18 remaining phishing sites are still live and loading the phishing payloads on all the
major browsers. Thus, we can conclude that cloaking vectors we mined and powered by PhishPrint are very effective in vastly
increasing the survival chances and lifetimes of phishing websites.

5.2

User Study Experiment

The phishing experiments showed that the five cloaking vectors powered by PhishPrint’s data can be very helpful in evading
WSCs. However, we also need to verify the specificity of these vectors and confirm that they are not excluding a lot of potential
victims. For this, we did an empirical evaluation with the help of a user study. We modeled our experiment as a survey on the
MTurk platform as this allowed us to ensure that unique workers take part in our experiment. We designed our experiment such
that after obtaining prior user consent, users are exposed to a web page with exactly the same client-side fingerprinting code
and server-side cloaking logic as in the phishing experiments. However, we removed the phishing payloads for this experiment
to avoid showing malicious content to real users. Also, same as in the phishing experiment, the IP-B and FCW-B vectors are
powered by the data collected by the profiling module in real-time. In the end, we made measurements of whether or not any
of the cloaking vectors decide to show cloaked content to the visiting users.
We received an exemption from our university IRB board for this experiment. In compliance with the terms of the exemption,
we took measures to not store any of sensitive information persistently such as the <FCW> BFPs or any other information
identifying the users such as IP addresses and request headers in our web servers. But, we did store the AS information for each
client’s IP address in order to gauge the geographical variety in locations of participants.
We performed this experiment from the third week of February 2020 to the first week of March 2020 as the profiling module
was collecting data for the longitudinal study. 150 unique users participated in our study that lasted about 16 days. 66% of the
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Mean
Median
90%

Canvas (s)

Font (s)

Total (s)

0.09
0.06
0.16

3.97
2.36
8.88

4.26
2.52
9.4

Table 5: Time taken for obtaining BFPs during user study
participants in our study were from the United States. However, the remaining 34% participants were spread across 35 countries
in 6 continents. Overall, the results showed that PhishPrint-powered cloaking logic decided to show phishing content for 79% of
the users. These numbers are 76.1% for U.S. users and 81.4% for non-U.S. users. This shows that the PhishPrint-based evasive
cloaking logic is largely specific to WSCs and can inflict harm on a large portion of users irrespective of their geographical location.
Breaking down the 21% false positive rates by cloaking vectors, we saw these numbers: FCW-B - 17.5%, AS-B - 1.7%,
CA-A - 1%, RB-A - 0.7%, IP-B - 0.1%. This was expected as other than FCW-B, all others cloaking vectors are known to be
specific either by definition (anomaly vectors and AS-B) or due to the nature of identifier used (chances of a WSC and a victim
sharing the same exact IP address are very low). As we did not store the <FCW>s, we were unable to analyze the distribution of
<FCW>s responsible for this. However, we have performed a thorough analysis on overlap between the <FCW>s of a much larger
pool of users and WSC data in 4.2.1.
One might also argue that such sophisticated fingerprinting based cloaking logic will result in a computational time delay that
can reduce the effectiveness of social engineering attacks launched on real users. In order to see if this is true, we measured the time
required to perform the cloaking logic as for the users in the user study. Our results (Table 5) show that most of the time is spent in
obtaining font fingerprints with mean time for the cloaking logic being 4.26 seconds. However, given that the mean time to fully
load a web page on desktop machine is about 10.4 seconds [9], we believe this is not a significant overhead that deters the attackers.
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6

Countermeasures

The CV Defense Scores reported in Table 1 can serve as a “report card" for WSCs trying to prioritize their mitigation efforts
across different cloaking vectors as below.
RB-A, CA-A. On the outset, this seems like a simple question of applying best practices as some WSCs already have “nearperfect" scores. However, this is only true to a certain extent. One issue is that many WSCs process a large number of URLs daily.
For this, it is common practice to make to use headless browsers for scalability [18]. However, this results in an arms race8 between
such browsers and their detectors [27]. While our rudimentary CA-A vectors did not take such sophisticated headless browser
detection features into account, it should be trivial to include them in PhishPrint profiling pages and come up with a much more
sophisticated anomaly cloaking vector. Further, biometric behavior-based bot detection systems can further complicate this issue
for WSCs [20] opening room for new evasion vectors. While handling all these issues might involve elaborate browser changes,
ML-driven crawler behavior, and/or scalability compromises, we suggest the WSCs to prioritize on fixing the simpler issues.
All WSCs should visit each URL atleast once with a “Real Browser" (even if headless) and try to hide all known artifacts [49].
IP-B, AS-B. For handling these vectors, WSCs have to diversify their network infrastructure in terms of both IP addresses
as well as geographical diversity and using residential networks. GSB and PhishTank are some of the best examples for this.
However, during our vulnerability disclosure, some WSCs have mentioned that it might be difficult for them to address this due
to financial implications. In these cases, we suggest that WSCs consider approaches such as using peer-to-peer VPN networks [7]
and sharing URLs with other WSCs to help improve network diversity.
FCW-B. FCW-B’s results were the most alarming as there was extremely limited diversity of <F,C,W>s across the entire WSC
ecosystem. The maximum score across all WSCs was only 9.3 with several WSCs having less than 10 distinct BFPs across hundreds of scanned URLs. Among these 3 BFPs, improving font diversity is the easiest to fix as it only needs increasing the number
of “font sets" installed in the crawler instances. When doing this, it need to be ensure though that the fonts match the general font
set characteristics of users from that geolocation. Some WSCs already started doing this as a result of our disclosures. However,
the Canvas and WebGL BFPs require more intricate mitigations. Currently, there are 3 approaches for such BFP defenses:
• Blocking. [26] proposed an ML-based BFP script blocking solution that detects BFP code. However, such solutions cannot be
used by WSCs as the presence of such blocking can itself be used for evasion (like RB-A). Instead of blocking, URLs can be
isolated for further automated/human analysis. However, the attackers can even fingerprint such analysts and add those BFPs
to their blocklists. Hence, such BFP detection methods might not work for WSCs. While client-side BFP blocking solutions
might still work, the problem here is that of coverage. Unless such a client-side solution is baked into all major browsers, it
might not achieve good coverage. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that many phishing victims may also be
slow adopters for technologies such as security extensions.
• Uniformity. Uniform software re-rendering (upon readback) approaches that result in the same BFPs for all users have also
8 At the time of writing this manuscript in October 2020, unfotunately the headless detectors seem to be winning this battle.
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been proposed [53]. However, these also have the same coverage issues as above. Unless, a majority of all users adopt the
same solution, WSCs will not be able to adopt these solutions. If not, the resulting uniform fingerprint can itself be used as
an evasion vector.
• Randomization. This works by randomizing the BFPs in each browsing session [35]. Brave browser has recently adopted
this to devise a solution for Canvas and WebGL BFPs by adding small random noise to the generated data. This is the most
promising approach for WSCs as it does not need to be adopt by non-WSCs for this to work.
Hence, we recommend WSCs to adopt similar transparent randomization-based defenses for their crawlers in order to
prevent Canvas and WebGL BFP cloaking weaknesses. Another possible solution is to use dynamic software reconfiguration
approaches [29], although these might have some scalability limitations.
While improvements in crawler infrastructure are imperative, it is also important for all the WSCs to prevent abuse of their
reporting infrastructure. In this research, by simply registering a single 2LD and self-reporting its wild card 3LDs, we were
able to collect a large amount of sensitive information such as BFPs and IP addresses of many WSCs at a very low cost. While
resources (such as network infrastructure) can be restricted based on 2LD, such strategies can also backfire. For example, an
attacker could self-report her own benign URLs to learn the limited and specialized profiling data related to her 2LD and then
easily switch into an evasive and malicious mode. However, the WSCs can at least use such separation techniques to divide their
limited crawler resources between submissions from vetted and non-vetted URL reporters. WSCs can also leverage existing spam
and anomaly detection research work to monitor and detect abuse of URL reporting services and prevent anomalous submissions
of token URLs for profiling of WSCs. This is even more important in the light of the fact that there has been an on going arms
race in the field of browser fingerprinting that could result in more novel BFP-based cloaking vectors in the future.
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7

Discussion

Vulnerability Disclosure. We are completing an effective vulnerability disclosure process and already submitted initial reports
to all 23 WSCs (21 vendors) that we have specifically profiled. 9 WSC vendors have so far acknowledged our results including
Google (GSB), Microsoft (SmartScreen, Outlook), Norton, AlienVault and Sophos. We had follow-up discussions over e-mail
and online meetings with 7 WSC vendors on our results. Of the 10 vendors, 3 mentioned that they are already working on changes
or aware of these limitations. 6 of them have reported to be working on follow-up changes with one vendor mentioning about
having tasked multiple engineers to work on the problems we pointed out in our paper. We also received a Google Vulnerability
Reward for ‘abuse-related methodologies’. Our reward amount was the highest in our category of ‘abuse-related methodologies’
indicating both ‘High Impact’ and ‘High Probability’ [10] of our mined cloaking vectors for GSB (RB-A and FCW-B).
Limitations. We note that all the profiling data we mined from WSCs was a result of reporting thousands of 3LDs of a single
.com 2LD. Each 3LD was reported only once from a single IP address. Hence, one might argue, that this data is not reflective
of the real weaknesses of the WSCs. However, our control experiment in § 4.2.2 shows that the profiling data when doing
repeated URLs (of multiple 2LDs) from multiple vantage points across the world looks very similar to the data we collected
with our setup. Furthermore, the results from our Phishing Experiments show that this profiling data generalizes well enough
to help successfully extend the life of 20 simulated phishing 2LDs created under the .xyz TLD (5.1.2). Finally, our successful
vulnerability disclosure process in which WSC vendors have directly confirmed the sensitive nature of the obtained profiling data
also proves the utility of PhishPrint. In the future, even if WSCs were to divide and limit their exposed crawling infrastructure
by the reporting IP addresses or TLDs, it would be easy to simply diversify this setup by using a VPN or creating multiple
representative sites. If this limitation was done by 2LD however, this can have even worse consequences as attackers can start
profiling and evading with the same 2LD. They can simply launch their 2LD as a benign site, self-report the site and gather all
the profiling data of the infrastructure reserved for this 2LD from the WSCs. They can they switch into an “malicious evasion"
mode powered by the gathered data. This essentially limits the amount of profiling that they will need to do.
On a related note, we would like to point out the “double-edged sword" nature of PhishPrint. In § 2, we mentioned how the
system design can allow researchers to study WSCs in a low-cost, highly scalable manner. However, at the same time, if a system
like PhishPrint falls into the hands of the attackers, they will be able to host long-lasting evasive malicious websites at a low-cost.
For this purpose, we have made recommendations, to monitor abuse of reporting APIs to all WSCs in 6. If such monitoring does
come into effect as a result of this study, we would welcome that as another positive security outcome. Furthermore, security
researchers can still seek special permissions to bypass such monitors and continue their evaluation of WSCs in a low-cost manner.
Future Work. Given the low-cost and scalable nature of PhishPrint, we would like to continue to use it to study more cloaking vectors. During our vulnerability disclosure, many WSCs have also encouraged us to do so. We received two Vulnerability
Research Grants from Google encouraging us to continue this line of work on studying their WSC (GSB). In the future, we
would like to study the resilience of WSCs against some other advanced BFP vectors such as MediaDevices and Battery Web
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API, Audio fingerprinting and fingerprinting of devices such as accelerometer and gyroscope. Furthermore, we would like to
use PhishPrint to measure the behavioral biometrics aspects of WSCs (such as their mouse movements, key presses etc) and
see the potential of developing ML-driven cloaking vectors from them.
Ethical Considerations. Our 70-day profiling study resulted in submitting 840 ‘token URLs’ to most WSCs at the rate of 12
URLs per day. During the 2-week period when our 20 phishing URLs were reported as well, this number went up to 32 per WSC
per day. While we concede that the time spent in scanning these URLs is a waste for the WSCs, we argue that this number is very
small in comparison to the huge number of URLs they receive each day. We have also disclosed our URL submission frequency
to all WSCs. Moreover, our method of submitting token URLs to WSCs to gain insights is similar to some prior works [37,39,40].
We assess the impact of our token URL submissions, with PhishTank as an example. With the help of PhishTank’s web portal
we were able to determine that our token URLs from both experiments accounted for less than 0.8% of their total received URLs
during that period. We argue that the security benefits gained by all the WSCs from our study far outweigh this minor overhead
that these WSCs experienced during our experimentation period. Some WSCs have also mentioned the same and asked us to
continue to submitting these URLs and share new insights in the future. With regards to the simulated phishing websites used
during the experiments, we did not share those URLs with any human users and only submitted them to the WSCs. We also
made sure that they are completely non-functional by removing all form submit buttons in order to prevent effects of accidental
exposure to users. Similar efforts were also made previously [37, 40]. We obtained IRB exemption for our user study and did
not store any sensitive information such as IPs or BFPs as described there ( 5.2).
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8

Related Work

Web security crawlers have largely been understudied despite their importance in protecting against a wide range of web attacks.
The closest works to ours are [37, 39, 40] all of which have focused on conducting blocklisting-oriented studies of web security
crawlers by using simulated phishing sites. PhishFarm [37] by Oest et al. has evaluated 10 WSCs against anti-cloaking techniques
used in real phishing kits. All of these works have focused on studying simple evasion techniques based on client’s IP address
or HTTP headers-based filtering, execution of simple JavaScript or obfuscation of page content. As a result, present WSCs (at
least collectively) have improved in handling such techniques [37]. PhishTime by Oest et al. conducted a longitudinal measure
of phishing websites in a controlled environment by manually crafting such phishing sites after finding in the wild. This showed
the effectiveness of WSCs in blacklists consistency. As such, it was able to provide a effective measurements in detecting the
weakness in the anti-phishing ecosystem in blacklist behavior for such evasive websites in longitudinal study [39]. Similary,
Peng et al. [40] evaluated the 68 vendors of VirusTotal in effectiveness against phishing URLs. The measurement analyzed the
network traffic, and dynamic label provided from each vendor, and their discrepancy in flagging such phishing URLs.
These above works focus on first creating multiple phishing websites, pre-fitting them with a chosen cloaking vector and
selectively self-reporting them to multiple WSCs to measure their effectiveness via observing blocklisting. However, PhishPrint,
provided a completely different design where we first use fully benign sites to profile the WSCs in a scalable, long-term fashion
and obtain sensitive profiling data from them. This profiling data can be analyzed directly to find unknown cloaking weaknesses
without need for any blocklisting. Such an approach allows much more scalable, low-cost generic evaluation of WSCs. We
discuss the design difference from prior works in § 2. Our system tries to mine multiple novel cloaking vectors that are shown
to be effective in driving phishing sites. This was not the case with these prior works which were only able to test already known
cloaking vectors or those found in-the-wild [37, 39].
Similary, a few other research works have focused on studying in-the-wild cloaking and evasive techniques [25, 38, 45, 52]
which was not our focus. These previous works have discussed cloaking techniques used to hide the true nature of the website.
One of the key and effective cloaking vectors we discovered uses advanced browser fingerprinting techniques on which there
have been many studies. This research included novel browser fingerprinting techniques [14, 21, 23, 36, 41, 43, 44], defenses
to thwart such fingerprinting [22, 29, 30, 35, 46, 47] and large-scale measurement analyses [24, 31, 50]. Pierre et al. [31] used
a 17-attribute (including features proposed by Eckersley [23]) fingerprinting script that used advanced fingerprinting techniques
like canvas fingerprinting and WebGL fingerprints to fingerprint client browsers. Acar et. al [14] discussed improvement of
transparency of advanced web tracking techniques for better privacy. While these works have studied the implications of browser
fingerprinting on privacy, our research work is focused on the security implications of these browser fingerprinting techniques.
No research study has been conducted so far to test the scanning engines used by the URL blacklisting services against these
advanced fingerprinting techniques proposed in the past several years.
All of these works were concerned with technicalities and privacy implications of browser fingerprinting but our work talks
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about the security effects of browser fingerprinting by deploying it as a cloaking vector.
Recently, researchers have begun to explore the question of how advanced browser fingerprinting can be leveraged to yield
security benefits [15, 28, 47, 51]. In particular, [51] analyzed the use of fingerprinting-based anti-bot scripts being used by
popular websites in the wild. Then, by using an array of handcrafted crawlers, the authors tried to measure the robustness of such
websites in detecting malicious crawlers. In our research, we answered the complementary question of how good the present
WSC bots are in detecting fingerprinting-based malicious cloaking websites.
To summarize, our work draws ideas from two related research areas: web cloaking and browser fingerprinting. We conducted
an in-depth review of the existing browserfingerpriting and cloaking mechanisms against WSCs. There has been study on web
cloaking and browser fingerprinting in large scale and in-depth; however none of these works have focused on systematically
evaluating the effectiveness of WSCs in defending against cloaking attacks devised using advanced browser fingerprinting
techniques such as Canvas and Font fingerprinting. To best of our knowledge, PhishPrint found to be the first work to focus
on building a platform for evaluation of WSCs against unknown cloaking weakness while completely avoiding the use of any
simulated phishing sites and blocklisting measurements. It thus enable mining of novel cloaking vectors from the unknown
weaknesses found in the WSCs. Our work mainly focus on evaluating the robustness of present-day web scanning engines
(WSCs) in defending against cloaking techniques that use advanced browser fingerprinting techniques. The study of 23 WSCs
discovered serious flaws that make them susceptible to advanced cloaking attacks.
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9

Conclusion

We built a novel scalable, low-cost and generic platform named PhishPrint to enable evaluation of Web Security Crawlers
(WSCs) against previously unknown cloaking weaknesses. PhishPrint completely avoids the use of any simulated phishing
sites and blocklisting measurements. We used PhishPrint to evaluate 23 WSCs. Our 70-day study found several unknown
cloaking weaknesses. In particular, it was shown that the entire WSC ecosystem is extremely vulnerable to a novel browser
fingerprinting-based cloaking attack. We confirmed the practical impact of our findings by deploying evasive phishing web
pages. We confirmed the specificity of these attack vectors. We also discuss countermeasures that all WSCs should take up in
terms of both their crawler infrastructure as well as reporting infrastructure. We have relayed the found weaknesses to the WSCs
through a vulnerability disclosure process that resulted in some remedial actions as well as multiple vulnerability rewards.
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A

Appendix

A.1

Specific Recommendations

During our profiling study, we saw some specific problems with PhishTank and GSB WSCs that are discussed below along with
suitable recommendations.

A.1.1

PhishTank

PhishTank shows the reported URLs on their website to allow human analysts to investigate them. We found a couple of serious
issues with PhishTank’s web portal ecosystem that are described below:
1. We noticed that repeated URL submissions are ignored by PhishTank and not shown in their homepage even if the URL
is being re-submitted from a different user account. An attacker can exploit this by simply self-reporting their URLs to
PhishTank a few days before adding malicious content to them. This will effectively prevent the URL from ever showing
up on the homepage and thus reduce the potential variety of visitors to which the website will get exposed. To prevent this,
PhishTank should bump up URLs to their homepage whenever they get resubmitted by a different user account.
2. We noticed that PhishTank allows their website visitors to open and check the new URLs either in a new window or in an
iframe in PhishTank. However, in both cases, it is possible for an attacker to check if the Referer points to phishtank.com
and trigger benign behavior. We have used this same evasion logic in our experiments. Thus, unless a human analysts copies
the URL and pastes it in their URL address bar, it will always carry the Referer artifact, thus making it easy for an attacker
to decide to cloak and evade manual analysis. Hence, we strongly recommend PhishTank to use Referrer-Policy headers
(for example, by setting it to same-origin) to combat such evasion strategies.

A.1.2

GSB

During the initial setup phase of our longitudinal study, we saw a couple of serious issues with GSB’s WSC infrastructure. As
these are specific to GSB, we are reporting them separately here.
1. We noticed that Google’s infrastructure was restricting large-sized data packets from being shipped out of their network
hosting their crawlers. For example, we were unable to ship 50 KB sized packet from the WSCs client browsers to our servers.
This was a peculiar restriction that we did not notice with any other WSC. As an attacker can easily abuse such properties
for evasion, we recommend GSB to re-consider such restrictions.
2. Further, we noticed that while all other WSCs take at least a couple of seconds to execute our fingerprinting scripts, GSB’s
crawlers were able to do this in less than 30 milliseconds. Our preliminary manual testing with many popular web browsers
also showed that it takes at least two seconds to execute this code. Attackers can thus use such timing discrepancies to detect
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WSCs
APWG
GSB
SmartScreen
PhishTank

Mobile Devices
(B)

US Desktop - GSB
(C)

Non-US Desktop GSB
(D)

Real Browser
(F = JSE-A)

1.000
0.000
0.000
0.992

0.942
0.347
0.001
0.998

0.690
0.741
0.075
0.998

1.000
0.914
0.989
1.000

Table 6: WSCs - PhishFarm’s anomaly-based cloaking vectors and PhishPrint’s JS-based cloaking vectors
the presence of a powerful JavaScript execution framework and trigger their cloaking logic. We did not need to include these
timing-based side channels in our cloaking logic as we were already able to handle GSB and other WSCs by using FCW-B.

A.2

Evolution of WSCs: Comparison with PhishFarm

As mentioned earlier, PhishPrint is a generic cloaking vector analysis system for WSCs. Thus, it allows us to compare the results
from previous research that surveyed some specific cloaking vectors against WSCs. To demonstrate this, we use PhishFarm [37].
Specifically, PhishFarm studied the effectiveness of 4 user agent-based cloaking vectors (called as Filters B,C,D and F) and
1 blocklist-based cloaking vector (called Filter E) against 5 WSCs. 4 of those WSCs overlap with our work. Hence, we wanted to
use our dataset to gauge the performance of these 4 WSCs against these cloaking vectors and see how these WSCs have evolved.
Filter B serves malicious traffic to only mobile user agents. Filters C and D serve malicious traffic to US and non-US based
clients that use Desktop GSB browsers (Chrome, Firefox or Safari). Filter F refered to as a “Real Browser" filter in their work is
in fact equivalent to JSE-A (as it is tied to a JS onload event execution). By analyzing the HTTP headers and IP addresses of the
collected data, we were able to gauge how well the WSCs would have defended against these filters if they were deployed in our
reported URLs. Table 6 shows the results. The CVD scores for these 4 vectors is shown in the 4 columns. The scores are shown as
fractions here in order to enable direct comparison with results from [37] which reported the scores on a scale of 0 to 1. Note that
we were unable to report about Filter E as it use a specific .htaccess file for blocklisting for which we do not have any access.
In the PhishFarm study, it was reported that except for Filter B, all the other filters would be defended against by one of
the WSCs. Further, it was mentioned that after the study, improvements have been made for defending against Filter B as well.
Our study confirms these results. Compared to the previous study, both APWG and PhishTank have massively improved with
respect to Filters B, C and D. However, unfortunately SmartScreen and GSB still don’t adequately scan from mobile user agents.
Further SmartScreen continues to perform badly on both filters C and D. The reason is that they mostly use IE based web browser
agents which the filter explicitly avoids. Thus, we can see how even though we did not have any of these vectors in mind when
designing PhishPrint, we were still able to evaluate the WSCs we saw in the study against these specific vectors by making
use of all the profiling data we obtained. This shows the generic nature of cloaking vector analysis provided by PhishPrint.

A.3

Browser Fingerprinting Code

We provide below the JavaScript code snippets for Canvas, WebGL and Font Fingerprinting that we adapted from AmIUnique
for profiling the WSCs.
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Listing 1: Canvas Fingerprinting Code
1
2

function generate_canvas_data () {

3

try {

4

var canvas = document.createElement ('canvas');

5

canvas.height = 60;

6

canvas.width = 400;

7

var canvasContext = canvas.getContext ('2d');

8

canvas.style.display = 'inline';

9

canvasContext.textBaseline = 'alphabetic';

10

canvasContext.fillStyle = '# f60';

11

canvasContext.fillRect (125 , 1, 62 , 20) ;

12

canvasContext.fillStyle = '#069';

13

canvasContext.font = '11 pt no-real-font-123';

14

canvasContext.fillText (" Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz , \ uD83D \ uDE03 " , 2, 15) ;

15

canvasContext.fillStyle = 'rgba (102 , 204 , 0, 0.7)';

16

canvasContext.font = '18 pt Arial';

17

canvasContext.fillText (" Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz , \ uD83D \ uDE03 " , 4, 45) ;

18

canvasData = canvas.toDataURL () ;

19

return canvasData;

20

} catch (e) {

21

canvasData = 'Not supported';

22

return canvasData;

23
24

}
}

Listing 2: WebGL Fingerprinting Code
1
2
3

function generate_web_gl_data () {
try {

4

var gl = canvas.getContext ('webgl') || canvas.getContext ('experimental-webgl');

5

var vShaderTemplate = 'attribute vec2 attrVertex;varying

6

var fShaderTemplate = 'precision mediump float;varying vec2 varyinTexCoordinate;void main () { gl_FragColor=vec4 ( varyinTexCoordinate ,0 ,1) ;}';

7

var vertexPosBuffer = gl.createBuffer () ;

vec2 varyinTexCoordinate;uniform vec2 uniformOffset;void main () { varyinTexCoordinate=attrVertex + uniformOffset;gl_Position=vec4 ( attrVertex ,0 ,1) ;}';

8

gl.bindBuffer ( gl.ARRAY_BUFFER , vertexPosBuffer );

9

var vertices = new Float32Array ([ -.2 , -.9 , 0, .4 , -.26 , 0, 0, .732134444 , 0]) ;

10

gl.bufferData ( gl.ARRAY_BUFFER , vertices , gl.STATIC_DRAW );

11

vertexPosBuffer.itemSize = 3;

12

vertexPosBuffer.numItems = 3;

13

var program = gl.createProgram () ;

14

var vshader = gl.createShader ( gl.VERTEX_SHADER );

15

gl.shaderSource ( vshader , vShaderTemplate );

16

gl.compileShader ( vshader );

17

var fshader = gl.createShader ( gl.FRAGMENT_SHADER );

18

gl.shaderSource ( fshader , fShaderTemplate );

19

gl.compileShader ( fshader );

20

gl.attachShader ( program , vshader );

21

gl.attachShader ( program , fshader );

22

gl.linkProgram ( program );

23

gl.useProgram ( program );

24

program.vertexPosAttrib = gl.getAttribLocation ( program , 'attrVertex');

25

program.offsetUniform = gl.getUniformLocation ( program , 'uniformOffset');

26

gl.enableVertexAttribArray ( program.vertexPosArray );

27

gl.vertexAttribPointer ( program.vertexPosAttrib , vertexPosBuffer.itemSize , gl.FLOAT , !1 , 0, 0) ;

28

gl.uniform2f ( program.offsetUniform , 1, 1) ;

29

gl.drawArrays ( gl.TRIANGLE_STRIP , 0, vertexPosBuffer.numItems );

30
31

if ( gl.canvas != null) {

32
33

return gl.canvas.toDataURL () ;
}

35

34

else {

35

return 'Not supported';

36

}

37
38

} catch (e) {

39

return 'Not supported';

40
41

}
}

Listing 3: Font List Fingerprinting Code
1
2
3

function get_font_list () {
var baseFonts = ['serif', 'sans-serif', 'monospace'];

4

// 1000+ test font list

5

var testFonts = ['. Aqua Kana', '. Helvetica LT MM', .... 'ori1Uni'];

6

var testSize = '72 px';

7

var testChar = 'A';

8

var h = document.getElementById ('font');

9
10

// Get the width of the text by creating a span

11

var s = document.createElement ('span');

12

s.style.fontSize = testSize;

13

s.innerText = testChar;

14

var defaultFonts = {};

15
16

for (var indexBaseFonts in baseFonts ) {

17

baseFont = baseFonts [ indexBaseFonts ];

18

s.style.fontFamily = baseFont;

19
20

if (h) {

21

h.appendChild (s);

22

defaultFonts [ baseFont ] = {};

23

defaultFonts [ baseFont ]['offsetWidth'] = s.offsetWidth;

24

defaultFonts [ baseFont ]['offsetHeight'] = s.offsetHeight;

25

h.removeChild (s);

26
27

}
}

28
29

fontsDetected = {};

30
31

for (var indexFont in testFonts ) {

32

font = fonts [ indexFont ];

33

detected = false;

34

fontStyle = '"' + font + '"';

35
36

for (var indexBaseFonts in baseFonts ) {

37

baseFont = baseFonts [ indexBaseFonts ];

38

// Append base font at the end of test font for fallback

39

s.style.fontFamily = fontStyle + ',' + baseFont;

40
41

if (h) {

42

h.appendChild (s);

43

var match = s.offsetWidth != defaultFonts [ baseFont ]['offsetWidth'] || s.offsetHeight != defaultFonts [ baseFont ]['offsetHeight'];

44

h.removeChild (s);

45

detected = detected || match;

46
47

if ( detected ) {

48

break;

49

}

50
51

}
}

52
53

fontsDetected [ font ] = detected;

36

54

}

55
56
57

return fontsDetected;
}
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